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Abstract: Principal-agent (PA) theory has been employed to characterize the relationship 
between states and the international organizations (IOs) that they are members of.  While the 
European Union (EU) has been considered a model for this sort of relationship, the tendency of 
PA theory to provide a static account of principals and agents has led to the dominant collective 
principal model declining in goodness of fit as the EU has changed over time.  By tracking 
changes in the EU from its inception as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the 
passage of the Lisbon Treaty, it is possible to identify structural changes that have strained the 
institutional relationship between members and the EU.  In the current context of the EU, neither 
the collective principal model nor the multiple principal model can perfectly capture the 
relationship.  Instead, a hybrid approach is needed that recognizes different avenues of re-
contracting that are available to specific members. 
Additionally, the structural progression of the EU has opened up the theoretical 
possibility of a role reversal between principal and agent.  The EU exerts a great deal of control 
over member-states through proceedings that the Commission initiates to compel members to 
comply with EU laws, as well as controlling the scope and pace of integration by regulating the 
procedures of enhanced cooperation and treaty opt-ins.  This indicates that states are being given 
direction by the EU, rather than the reverse. 
Though the EU is very much unique among IOs, these developments are parsimonious 
enough that it is possible for them to occur in other institutional arrangements as well.  Much of 
the impetus for these shifts can be found in the European focus on the normative benefits of 
integration which, instituted in another context, could lead to similar shifts occurring.  
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Introduction 
 
Principal-agent (PA) theory has developed as a neofunctional way to look at why, and 
under what conditions, authority is delegated from one person or group (the principal or 
principals) to another (the agent).  While not its initial application, this framework has been 
applied to international relations, and more specifically in the subfield of international 
organizations (IOs).  The emphasis on transaction costs and rational choice has made PA theory 
a fruitful avenue for examining the delegation to IOs, and there is no case that fits this narrative 
better than that of the European Union (EU).  While it has previously been studied in the context 
of traditional PA theory, the EU of today has changed dramatically over the years, and these 
changes call for re-considering the fit of the conventional PA theory to the changed institutional 
framework and source of relationships between the Union and its member-states. 
The literature on PA theory treats relationships as static and unchanging, while the 
institutional changes that have been made to the EU over time have led to a different 
arrangement today than in the past.  PA theory requires a mechanism for updating the 
relationship between principals and agents at the international level.  A close examination of the 
EU shows that the organization has, at times, fit very well with different narratives in the PA 
literature, but that the appropriate model and goodness of fit changes over time. 
From its beginning as the six-member European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
with little authority and a requirement of unanimity, the EU has grown into a large IO with 
complex mandates and decision-making procedures.  To say that the PA relationship today is the 
same as in 1951 (when the ECSC was founded), or even in 1993 (when the Maastricht Treaty 
formally created the EU), would misrepresent the organization itself and the way in which it 
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interacts with its member-states.  By looking at the Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs) with 
a specific focus on the way they affected the PA relationship, the need for a dynamic account of 
PA interaction in the IOs literature will become clear.  Additionally, the current trajectory of the 
EU leaves open the possibility that a new category of classification may be developed.  The EU’s 
development leaves open the possibility that a new theoretical category may emerge, in which 
the principal and agent may trade places. 
This thesis has four central goals.  First, it will trace the evolution of the EU over time 
and demonstrate how the standard PA model accounts for this growth.  Between the founding of 
the European Community with the Rome Treaty in 1958 and the establishment of the European 
Union in 1993, a number of structural changes occurred that shifted the goodness of fit of the 
collective principal model and allowed it to be replaced by the multiple principal model.  
Looking at both the traditional PA literature and the institutional development of the EU will 
establish the baseline condition of both.  Understanding the PA literature and the EU in the 
standard narrative will be a strong starting point for looking at the changes the EU has undergone 
and how it has moved away from the basic account. 
Second, the way that PA theory is applied to the EU must be examined in the context of 
the institutional changes that have been implemented through the IGCs.  A source of the 
disconnect between PA accounts and the EU’s development is that the PA model tends to keep 
the relationship static, while the EU has been in a constant state of growth and change.  The 
addition of new members, changing of voting procedures, and shifting expectations about 
decision-making all contributed to a shift in the model of best fit from a standard collective 
principal model to a collective-multiple principal hybrid.  The dynamic nature of the relationship 
3 
 
and the hybrid of the two institutional forms are events that do not conform to standard PA 
theory. 
Specifically, the way that voting and decision-making procedures changed with the 
passage of the Maastricht Treaty and the Schengen Agreement highlight examples of shifts 
toward an arrangement that allows specific individual member-states like the UK and Denmark 
to have much more influence than a member of a collective principal would have.  Though it is 
theoretically possible for other member-states to attain this same level of access, it appears 
limited to only a few states currently. 
Third, the potential for a new model to characterize the EU is considered.  Though it is 
not argued that such a change has already occurred in the EU, the thesis contends that it is 
theoretically possible for principals and agents to reverse roles.  The expanding discretion and 
autonomy afforded to the EU over the course of its development has demonstrated the 
possibility, and its continued development will provide the best venue to determine if this change 
can occur. 
 Concluding, the possibility of another IO mirroring the direction in which the EU has 
moved will be considered.  The EU is, in many ways, unique in the world of IOs.  With this in 
mind, the applicability of both the dynamic change and possible role reversal must be 
considered, with the central question being whether, and under what circumstances, these 
changes could occur in other IOs.  Though much of the EU’s development makes it unique in the 
world of IOs, and there does not appear to be an IO currently structured in a way that makes it 
likely for the same shifts to occur as the EU has undergone, the theory remains parsimonious 
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enough to be applied outside of the European context.  To begin, the theoretical underpinnings of 
the PA literature must be developed and applied to the EU. 
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Chapter One: Principal-Agent Theory and International Organizations 
 
 Delegation is the action inherent in a principal-agent relationship, and may be defined as: 
“a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on 
behalf of the former.  This grant of authority is limited in time or scope and must be revocable by 
the principal.”
1
  Principals, therefore, only exist if agents do, and vice versa.  Another important 
qualification is that principals contract agents (formally or informally), and that one defining 
characteristic of the principal is that “an actor must be able to both grant authority and rescind 
it.”
2
 
PA theory developed as a solution to questions of delegation, and offers a rational 
account of why, and under what conditions, authority is delegated from one actor to another.  
The standard narrative is that this is done in a framework of rational choice, and is intended to 
lower transaction costs of policy-making and implementation.
3
  Delegation is therefore an option 
for states when they are able to gain more from the act of delegating than from acting on their 
own and alone, and when the benefits of delegation outweigh the costs.
4
  There are a number of 
different configurations for these relationships to be structured, and their makeup affects the way 
that the actors interact with one another. 
A major feature of this relationship is the way in which the agent represents the interests 
of the principal.  If the principal is unable to rely on the agent, then they must expend resources 
keeping track of the agent, which increases the transaction cost and cuts down on the benefit of 
delegation.  Agents are not only interested in the outcomes desired by their principals, but have 
                                                          
1
 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006; pg. 7 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Pollack, 2007 
4
 Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999 
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their own agendas as well.  The claim that agents are “self-interest seeking with guile”
5
 has been 
used to characterize the behavior of agents, representing that they are apt to pursue their own 
agendas even while representing that they work in the interest of their principal(s). 
The problem of accountability among agents is the most difficult thing for principals to 
overcome.  The relationship is perpetually skewed in favor of the agent, which makes it 
challenging for the principal to do even basic things like observe the actions the agent takes on 
its behalf.
6
  The specialized knowledge that agents possess and the lack of constant oversight 
creates an asymmetry of both information and opportunity.  This imbalance leads to three 
specific problems for principals.  First, agents can hide information from principals, taking 
advantage of the asymmetry that results from the specialized knowledge they possess.  Second, 
agents can take action without the principal’s knowledge, pursuing their own agendas.  Third, 
principals need agents to fulfill their mandates, which practically means that they can get away 
with some deviation.
7
 
“Independent action by an agent that is undesired by the principal” is known as agency 
slack,
8
 and is a great concern for principals.  There are two primary forms that slack takes.  The 
first, known as shirking, occurs when “an agent minimizes the effort it exerts on its principal’s 
behalf.”
9
  The agent does not do everything in its power to fulfill its mandate, often because of 
some external opportunity or circumstance.  Alternatively, slippage occurs when “an agent shifts 
                                                          
5
 Williamson, 1985; pg. 30 
6
 Bergman, 2000 
7
 Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991 
8
 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006; pg. 8 
9
 Ibid. 
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policy away from its principal’s preferred outcome and toward its own preferences.”
10
  In this 
case, the agent is actively pursuing its agenda rather than that of the principal. 
The potential for slack is something that is inherent in delegation, and that principals 
must acknowledge and deal with.  Accounting for it in the structure and contract of the initial 
delegation, or by re-contracting, give principals opportunities to deal with slack.
11
  The challenge 
of delegation is how to deal with the asymmetrical distribution of information.  The agent’s 
position is often difficult for the principal to ascertain, while the agent knows exactly where the 
principal stands.  Additionally, the specialized knowledge that makes delegation attractive 
initially can prevent the principal from knowing the degree to which slack is present.
12
 
This is important, because the act of delegation comes with a grant of autonomy, or “the 
range of potential independent action available to an agent after the principal has established 
mechanisms of control.”
13
  Autonomy and slack are similar to one another, but remain distinct.  
Autonomy encompasses the freedom to act that the agent has, which may take the form of slack 
but does not have to.  The agent can choose to act on the mandate provided by the principal or 
ignore it, which determines whether its autonomy is expressed in the form of slack or not. 
The principal can limit the potential for problems by providing discretion, or “a grant of 
authority that specifies the principal’s goals but not the specific actions that the agent must take 
to accomplish those objectives.”
14
  By making the course of action clear to the agent, the 
principal cuts down on the agent’s ability to slack while still allowing the use of autonomy to 
achieve goals.  All of the above typify the issues that principals face in trying to reduce agency 
                                                          
10
 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006; pg. 8 
11
 Ross, 1973 
12
 Pollack, 2003 
13
 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006; pg. 8 
14
 Ibid. 
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losses.  These occur when “when agents engage in undesired independent action or when they 
[principals] themselves expend resources to contract with or monitor and control those agents.”
15
 
Agency losses create the potential for two specific problems.  The first issue is 
uncertainty: an agent or principal must determine whether outcomes (positive or negative) are 
the result of genuine efforts on the part of the agent, or circumstances that the agent could not 
control.  The second issue is specialization and costs.  Delegation is done for the purpose of 
utilizing specialization and division of labor, which means that it is generally inefficient for the 
principal to expend resources checking up on the principal.  The more this must be done, the less 
beneficial the arrangement is for the principal
16
 
With these concerns in mind, there are a number of avenues available to principals to 
keep agents in check.  As noted above, discretion-based delegation is an option for principals 
who wish to avoid these issues.  In situations with a great deal of uncertainty, the benefits of 
discretion are high for principals, who can trust the specialized knowledge of the agent when 
they know that the goal has been specified.
17
  The benefit of discretion is that it allows agents the 
freedom to navigate situations with high levels of preference heterogeneity while working out a 
policy that fits with the principals’ desires.
18
 
Alternatively, principals can monitor the actions of their agents in an effort to determine 
how well they are keeping to their mandate.  The two primary methods of monitoring the 
performance of an agent are known as “fire alarm” and “police patrol” enforcement.
19
  The fire 
alarm method relies on reports from the media, interest groups, etc. to find out if problems exist, 
                                                          
15
 Ibid; pg. 9 
16
 Ibid. 
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 Cooter, 2000; pg. 94 
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 McCubbins and Page, 1987; pg. 418 
19
 Vaubel, 2006 
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and police patrol method involves much more active, hands-on tracking of the agent.  Both 
methods help principals gain information, but in different ways
 20
.  The police patrol method 
allows the least amount of slack to develop, but also requires the highest transaction costs.  Fire 
alarms tend to be more efficient, and to incentivize reporting on agents.
21
  These methods of 
oversight are the most commonly used tools for principals to keep track of agents. 
No matter how well structured the contract between the principal and agent, how sincere 
the agent is in representing the preferences of the principal, or how effective oversight and 
sanctions are, slack is unavoidable.  However, the presence of slack does not indicate any sort of 
failing in the delegation process.  Delegating may still be preferable to not delegating even if 
slack occurs.  The thing that principals must consider is whether their relative gains are worth the 
costs of the delegating.
22
 
In spite of the potential pitfalls, there are still compelling reasons for principals to engage 
in delegation.  Principals are able to overcome high degrees of slack in contracting with agents, 
and benefit from even arrangements that have considerable slack.
23
  In addition to the gains they 
receive from specialization and division of labor, principals also benefit through agents’ help in 
managing policy externalities, facilitating collective decision-making, revolving disputes, 
enhancing credibility, and creating policy bias.
24
  While all are important, agenda-setting, 
enhancing credibility, and creating policy bias are particularly important for the EU. 
Agenda-setting refers to the ability of agents to create a stable agreement where states 
would not have been capable of doing so on their own.  This differs subtly from the policy 
                                                          
20
 Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010 
21
 McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984 
22
 Gould, 2003 
23
 Nielson, and Tierney, 2006 
24
 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006 
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externality position, which allows states to express their interests and reach either mutually 
beneficial or Pareto optimal solutions.  The agenda-setting function describes a situation in 
which the agent actually synthesizes differing interests from principals into a policy that is 
acceptable to all.
25
  In the case of European integration, this ensures that the issues of all states 
can receive consideration, and that efforts are made to accommodate all of the principals. 
Enhancing credibility is important from the perspective of the principals.  Being a 
member of an IO can both create and increase the state’s perceived legitimacy internationally.  
The act of re-contracting and expanding the agent’s mandate or the scope of its autonomy can 
enhance the perception of the principal’s commitment to an agent or a particular issue-area.
26
  
The EU is emblematic of this, and it has specifically been argued that delegation in Europe is 
more about the enhanced credibility than specialization.
27
 
Creating policy bias is of strategic value to domestic actors as they work through IOs.  
The idea is to codify or “lock-in” the state’s commitment to an IO so that it is later difficult to 
undo.
28
  By creating a commitment to an IO agent seeking a particular policy outcome, the 
principal can maintain an ideological commitment.  This is because the agent can take action 
without the political cost that would accompany similar action on the part of the principal.  The 
monitoring ability of the EU, provided to the Commission in Article 226 is a strong example of 
this, as it provides for the possibility of non-compliance penalties.
29
 
Access to the costs and benefits of PA relationships is affected by every step of the 
delegation process.  The type of contracting done by the principal matters in determining how it 
                                                          
25
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 Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006. 
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receives benefits and what sort of agency losses it accrues.  One of the important issues is the 
structure of the delegation.  The most basic model of delegation is that of the single principal, in 
which authority is delegated from one principal to one agent.  In this instance, it is a relatively 
straightforward process for preferences to be dictated from one to the other.  Though the 
possibility for slack is always present, this model makes the expression of preferences simple.  
Figure 1.1 illustrates the basic form of delegation. 
 
Figure 1.1: Single Principal Relationship 
It is also possible for the agent to represent the interests of more than one principal.  This 
is the most common in dealing with IOs, where agents are designed to act on behalf of multiple 
member-states.  When more than one actor designs and has authority over a common contract for 
a single agent, this is known as a collective principal model.
30
  The group of principals must 
reach agreement to (re)contract with an agent, and cannot do so unless they have some method 
for reaching a consensus.  In a multiple principal model, there is only one contract that binds all 
of the principals to the agent.  This is considered to be the most common PA relationship in IOs, 
and is shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2: Collective Principal Relationship 
                                                          
30
 Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006 
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Alternatively, a multiple principal arrangement exists when the agent has separate 
contracts with distinct principals.
31
  In this case, each of these principals may negotiate its 
contract separately, independent of the preferences of others.  This goes beyond simply giving 
veto power, as with the UN Security Council.  The act of re-contracting is different from vetoing 
change, and is not usually afforded by IOs to their members.  The multiple principal model is 
demonstrated by Figure 1.3 
 
Figure 1.3: Multiple Principal Relationship 
 Identifying the type of relationship correctly is important for PA theory, because it can 
affect the type of analysis done as well as the results.  Correctly identifying whether a 
relationship is a collective or multiple principal arrangement affects the evaluation of 
responsiveness, and can have adverse effects on results of empirical testing.
32
  For example, 
consensus building among principals is much more important in a collective principal 
arrangement than it is in a multiple principal arrangement, because in a multiple principal 
arrangement each member can negotiate separately.  Incorrectly categorizing a multiple principal 
                                                          
31
 Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast, 1989 
32
 Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney, 2006 
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arrangement as a collective principal arrangement could make the agent seem less responsive in 
this case. 
Equally important, the role of the agent itself must be considered.  Agents can make 
strategic decisions in the same way that principals can, and their decisions affect the arrangement 
that they share as much as those of their principals.
33
  The complexity of agent strategies goes 
beyond basic self-interest seeking, and there are a number of strategies that they can employ.  An 
agent such as the EU has the advantage of having built rapport with its principals over time, 
which allows it to develop a working relationship and a case for expanded duties. 
Since principals “rarely delegate all at once to new agents but rather delegate only limited 
tasks or for a limited time,”
34
 it is to the advantage of a principal with the opportunity to keep 
their interests close to those of its principals initially, and to work toward more autonomy.  After 
the scope of its autonomy is expanded, then the agent can ask for more discretion, or can claim it 
for itself through alternate methods. 
Some of the most effective ways for the agent to actively work toward expanding its 
mandate is to reinterpret rules gradually, reinterpret to split principals, procedural innovation, 
and ask principals to formalize informal rules.
35
  These can be used to encourage principals to 
give more autonomy and discretion to the agent, and may also increase the likelihood of slippage 
or slack.  In the case of the EU, gradual interpretation of rules and formalizing informal rules 
have both been utilized in securing gains that will be highlighted below. 
                                                          
33
 Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006 
34
 Ibid.; pg. 206 
35
 Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006;  pg. 207 
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 A major feature of principal-agent relationships is that they are subject to change over 
time.  Implicit in discussions of (re)contracting, slack, and losses is the understanding that these 
arrangements are not static.  Theorizing about PA relationships points out that costs and benefits 
shift over time, but the implications of this are more than abstractions.  Developing a theory of 
evolving roles in a principal-agent arrangement necessitates the incorporation of changes over 
time.  Though different models for PA relationships exist, the way in which the model is applied 
is important.  The literature treats PA relationships as static, to the extent that they are 
characterized by the institutional features of the IO in question.  However, the current EU is the 
result of a number of institutional changes made over time. 
 In characterizing a relationship as one of either collective or multiple principal, it is 
important to look at decision-making procedures.  Although unanimous agreement need not be 
considered as a prerequisite for a collective principal arrangement to exist, it is certainly the case 
that all members must ultimately be held to the same standards when decisions are made; this is 
the point of the collective principal model.  Since the existing literature treats the arrangement 
between principal and agent as static, it is necessary to settle on a measure to characterize the 
change that is occurring in a shift from collective to multiple principal models. 
 The changing process of voting in the EU has been selected to do the majority of the 
work in characterizing this relationship over time.  The shift to qualified majority voting offers a 
particular point of reference, as do the alternate arrangements they give rise to (detailed below), 
because they drive the process of both daily operation and institutional changes.  Removing the 
unanimity requirement of the ECSC allowed the heterogeneous interests of the member-states to 
come to the fore.  A benefit for the agent to be found in greater heterogeneity is that it can help 
15 
 
them acquire greater discretion to negotiate a final policy
36
, which is closely connected to 
credible commitments and policy lock-in. 
 The move toward a multiple principal model that is proposed focuses on the ability of 
individual member-states to re-contract on specific legislative initiatives.  The model for this 
comes from Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney’s consideration of the World Bank, which 
features different, overlapping principals.  In this case, though the Executive Directors act as a 
collective principal, the US Congress is able to act as a separate principal in a way that allows it 
to approximate a multiple principal.
37
 
 However, heterogeneity can also harm the interests of the agent, as it appears to have 
done in the case of the EU.  Emphasizing preference heterogeneity may make states less likely to 
delegate an issue to an IO
38
, as in the development of the Schengen Agreement and the 
procedures of closer and enhanced cooperation.  This process allows individual member-states or 
small groups to act on their own or to re-contract with the agent.  When the role-reversal model 
is developed, the notion of heterogeneity shifts back toward the attempt to use higher levels of 
discretion to create a focus on final policy outcomes. 
 To conclude this opening section, principal-agent theory is used in the literature to 
explain why states delegate authority to international organizations.  These organizations matter 
in the international environment in which they function, and have the ability to affect change.  
The primary motivation for states to participate is that there are benefits to doing so, which 
derive primarily from the decreased transaction costs and specialization that IOs offer.  
 Principals develop specific mechanisms to deal with the potential deviations that agents 
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 Nielson and Tierney, 2003; pg. 255 
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may perpetrate, with designs on ensuring that they fulfill their mandate and represent the specific 
interests they are given.  Though they must be wary of attempts on the part of the agent to ignore 
their mandate or slack, they will tend to maintain a contract so long as the losses do not outweigh 
the benefits.  The dynamic relationship that develops over time between principals and their 
agent will be important for evaluating the growth and change in the European Union over time. 
 Structurally, the type of arrangement between principals and agents matters in evaluating 
the effectiveness of the institutions.  The interaction between principals and agents in a collective 
principal arrangement is different from a multiple principal arrangement.  These differences are 
especially important to consider when looking at the changes that an IO undergoes over time, as 
the EU has done constantly.  The importance of change over time is the final element needed to 
examine PA relationships theoretically.  Tracking the course the EU has taken through its 
development history will be important for theorizing. 
 Chapter two begins with a brief application of PA theory to the EU, showing how it is 
traditionally applied.  However, this standard application is found to be inadequate.  The model 
of PA theory that applies to the EU, and the goodness of its fit, has changed over time.  A close 
examination of the EU shows that the organization began with a collective principal model 
before moving to a multiple principal model over time.  Further, the current trajectory of the 
organization suggests an impending shift toward a new theoretical model that reverses the 
principal and agent roles. 
 Chapter three develops a more in-depth look at the possibility of the principal and agent 
roles being reversed, and goes on to consider whether it is possible for this type of shift to occur 
and whether it has occurred in the case of the EU.  Extending this analysis, beyond the scope of 
17 
 
the EU, the theoretical underpinnings of such a shift are considered in the context of future 
research. 
 To preview, the unique development of the EU over time has created an institutional 
environment where it appears possible for the principal and agent to change and indeed to 
reverse roles, though it is not the contention of this thesis that the latter shift has already 
occurred.  Further, although the EU is an exceptional case, these institutional factors are as 
connected to the principal-agent relationship as they are to the particular way in which the EU 
developed.  In other words, it is possible for the shifts that occurred in the case of the EU to 
occur in other PA relationships as well. 
  
18 
 
Chapter Two: The European Union’s Development 
 
 The European Union is regarded as a major success from an IO standpoint.  It embodies 
the neoliberal institutional argument that institutions can have agency of their own and exert 
influence on international affairs independent the states that compose them.  While principal-
agent theory has been used to evaluate the EU, its specific application and the results have 
fluctuated noticeably.  Examining the IGCs and the institutional changes to the EU over time will 
reveal how the dominant collective principal arrangement has been replaced by a hybridization 
of collective and multiple principal models. 
 While some have adopted the PA framework only loosely in reference to the EU,
39
 others 
have used it as a more literal way to examine the relationship between the member-states and 
Brussels.  At the most basic level, the EU is considered to be the agent of its members, and it has 
been given a great deal of autonomy to further integration efforts.  Though its efforts are diverse 
and cover a wide range of issues and issue-areas, the mandate that the EU has been given is most 
succinctly labeled as integration.  It is responsible for the scope, pace, and direction of 
integration efforts in Europe.  This is important to keep in mind when tracking the changes that 
the EU has undergone, but the state of the current literature must be considered first. 
 Principal-agent theory offers some advantages over other ways of looking specifically at 
the EU.  Its ability to “generate nuanced hypotheses” has allowed it to develop subtleties that are 
beyond neofunctionalism.
40
  Additionally, it is able to distill the important components from 
complex institutional relationships and target the components that are most important.
41
  These 
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features establish the importance of the approach, but model that is applied (collective or 
multiple principals) is important to how it is viewed. 
 As mentioned in chapter one, the model that is applied is of great importance.  The 
dominant narrative has been one that treats the member-states as belonging to a collective 
principal that contracts with the EU.
42
  In this account, the member-states make up the collective 
principal by virtue of all being bound by the same treaties and all sharing the same interest in 
European integration.  This shared set of operating parameters, and the communal process of 
negotiating their way forward, has led the collective principal model to be attractive. 
 Though the collective principal model’s simple representation of the EU may be 
appealing, it comes at a price.  Treating the EU as a unitary actor ignores institutional complexity 
presented by the separate bodies and the interests they represent.  The different roles played by 
the Commission and the Parliament shape the way that the EU interacts with member-states.  
The internal dynamic of the EU, the way that these bodies interact with one another, may be just 
as important as the relationship between the member-states collectively and the EU collectively.  
To only think of the EU as a unitary actor would be a mistake.
43
 
 The idea that the EU is best represented by a multiple principal relationship may manifest 
itself in two different ways.  First, as Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney suggest,
44
 it may be that the 
member-states and the European Parliament both act as principals for the Commission, which 
has legislative initiative and may be considered the “true” agent within the structural layers of 
the EU.  In this framework, the Parliament represents the broad range of (often diverging) 
interests of average European citizens, while the member-states represent their interests.  In this 
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way, they form competing principals that each have their own agenda to pursue.  The 
Commission must then balance these separate mandates and faces the standard issue of working 
with multiple principals. 
This interpretation is challenged by Pollack, who argues that the Parliament does not 
have the ability to re-contract with the Commission.
45
  Though it may censure the Commission 
and must approve the European Council’s nominees, the Parliament cannot make changes to the 
Commission itself.  Only by acting with the Council of Ministers can the Parliament really affect 
the Commission, and they do not share the same interests in representation. 
Though unwilling to accept the multiple principal relationship proposed by Lyne, 
Nielson, and Tierney, Pollack does not deny that the arrangement is unique.  Describing (but not 
defining) it as a dual accountability relationship,
46
 he concedes that the situation in the EU is 
unique from any other, and warrants some distinction from a standard collective principal model.  
The narrative of the multiple principal model applied in this way is interesting, and the EU’s 
institutional complexity should be broken down for analysis, but the progress made by 
considering EU institutions as separate in the process is undone by continuing to think of the 
member-states as a collective principal. 
The second way that the multiple principal model may be applied, and the approach this 
thesis will argue for and utilize, is one that thinks of the member-states as being the principals of 
the EU.  Rather than thinking of the member-states as a collective principal who represent 
national interests that compete with the shared, collective interests of the European Parliament, 
this model suggests each member-state represents their own interests to the EU by making use of 
                                                          
45
 Pollack, 2006 
46
 Pollack, 2006; pg. 193 
21 
 
the different channels of access that it provides for them.  This approach does not de-emphasize 
the institutional complexity of the EU, acknowledging that there are multiple access points for 
member-states, but focuses on their diverse interests as an alternative to treating them as though 
they have the same set of preferences. 
Looking at both the collective and multiple principal models together offers a better 
account of the EU than the collective principal model by itself.  The changes it has undergone as 
a result of the IGCs have changed the institutional structures and have rewarded shifts in the 
direction of this model, as will be illustrated below.  Incorporating more members, changing 
voting procedures, and allowing opt outs all moved the EU away from a collective principal 
model and toward a multiple principal model.  However, there are still some instances in which 
the collective principal model is applicable. 
This interpretation of the multiple principal model may seem to collapse some of the 
complexity built into Pollack’s conception of the EU, but it only changes the focus.  Far from 
treating the EU as a unitary actor, it is free to acknowledge that there are different interests 
within member-states, and that they access the EU itself in different ways.  The government in 
power may choose to communicate directly to the EU through public statements or access it 
through either the Council of Europe or the Council of Ministers, while the parties that are less 
successful may rely on the European Parliament to voice their preferences. 
The first issue should be to demonstrate that it does not suffer from the same short-
coming that Pollack levels at the European Parliament, namely that member-states cannot 
individually re-contract with the EU.  While a more detailed answer to this issue will be 
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developed later, it will suffice for the moment to say that while this is a legitimate concern that is 
addressed by looking at the process of passing legislation through the EU. 
The EU’s development over time must be considered next, and will show that the 
multiple principal model should be incorporated because of the way that its institutions have 
been changed over time by its IGCs.  The uniqueness of its development over time contributes 
strongly to the difficulties in characterizing it succinctly.  Tracking the changes it underwent 
over time will help to establish the EU as a complex IO that cannot be represented by a static PA 
model.  Instead, the changes it has undergone should be considered, to demonstrate how the shift 
from a collective principal model to a hybrid occurred. 
Changes in the EU over time 
 To think of the EU as a standard international organization would be to undersell the 
longevity of the institution and the principles upon which it has developed.  Most importantly, 
the changes that it has undergone, from its founding as the European Coal and Steel Community 
to the European Union today, underscores the characteristics that make it distinct from other IOs.  
The scope of its mandate and autonomy make the EU a special case among IOs. 
 Originally a common market venture between France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg, it was conceived as a way to utilize integration efforts to bring 
stability to post-WWII Europe, and economic cooperation was a strong first step.  This 
cooperation had the additional benefit of allowing other Western European nations to monitor 
Germany by creating a common market for the six nations in the important coal and steel 
industries.  At this time it was formed in 1951, the ECSC only had six members, little authority 
for decision-making, and was required to have unanimous support before passing any initiative. 
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The case of the ECSC is a strong example of a collective principal relationship.  Since the 
number of members was small, it was possible for the member-states to have a high degree of 
direct oversight and to ensure that the ECSC was doing exactly as mandated.  In the early stages 
of development, the economic benefits of cooperation were the primary interest of the member-
states, and they ceded only as much authority as was necessary to see these benefits.
47
  The 
requirement that the states come to a unanimous agreement before taking action strongly 
reinforces the collective principal.  In the case of the ECSC, this meant that the delegation of 
authority was little, and that the level of autonomy and discretion were essentially non-existent.  
This was a very straightforward PA relationship with strong police patrol oversight.  This fits 
with the goal of the ECSC to increase cooperation at a basic level and to broach the possibility of 
greater levels of integration in the aftermath of the conflicts that dominated the first half of the 
20
th
 century.   
 The degree of autonomy that was afforded to the ECSC was relatively low, offering few 
opportunities to exercise their discretion.  With little to no opportunity for slack to develop, it 
functioned largely as a forum for facilitating discussion between the members.  The newness of 
the integration effort also contributed to the lack of slack, both because the new IO had not 
developed distinct preferences of its own and because it was not afforded a level of autonomy 
that would allow it to take advantage of slack.  At this time, the ECSC may be thought of as 
existing to deal with the coordination and collaboration issues of policy externality.  The states 
work together through this framework to reach mutually beneficial outcomes and avoid sub-
optimal equilibria.  This is the most basic function of IOs, and is the primary driver for the 
ECSC.   
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 Member-states got exactly what they wanted at this time: economic integration with little 
impact in other sectors.
48
  Since they had a high degree of police patrol oversight, and since all 
members had to be in agreement for action to be taken, it was relatively simple for the ECSC to 
fulfill their mandate.  That is, when action was taken, it was sure to be in line with the 
preferences of all of the principals.  Even if some of the principals make concessions or 
compromises with one another, they still reached broad agreement.  This takes care of the two 
concerns of agents: achieving desired outcomes and avoiding slack.  Since unanimity was 
required to take action, it minimized the issue of different members of the collective principal 
communicating radically different interests and being forced to disregard some interest(s).  
Additionally, the high degree of oversight and limited independent authority that were given to 
the ECSC means that there was little it could do on its own.  As a result, it was not able to 
disregard its principals and act in its own interests. 
Incremental steps were taken that transformed the ECSC into the European (Economic) 
Community, and that changed its mandate to fit the political sentiment of the time.  By the time 
the Maastricht Treaty officially established the European Union in 1993, the authority and 
mandate it had were radically different from the original, as were the interests that it was obliged 
to try to represent.  These changes led to the collective principal model growing worse in its fit 
and the multiple principal model gaining explanatory power, and it is this process that needs 
attention next. 
A number of factors led to the changes that the European integration initiative underwent, 
some driven by the principals and others driven by the agent.  As noted above, the agency that is 
afforded to agents in the neoliberal institutional framework means that agents can have strategies 
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of their own, which determine the way they engage with their principals.  Though there was little 
strategy involved in the basic ECSC mandate at this time, they successfully laid the groundwork 
for changing this in future interactions by demonstrating a commitment to the original mandate.
49
 
Regarding the mandate of the organization, the 1957 Treaty of Rome essentially allowed 
the cooperation of the ECSC to work in other sections of the market as well.  By creating a 
common market for goods and labor, as well as more relaxed customs regulations, the Treaty 
was an application of the member-states’ desire to expand economic integration and a step 
toward fulfilling its mandate.
50
  Since the members shared this interest and worked closely with 
one another and the agent to achieve it, the collective principal model fits well for describing the 
process.  It also provided the opportunity for an expansion of autonomy to the instruments of 
integration. 
 The Rome Treaty went into effect on January 1, 1958, the same day as a second treaty, 
which established the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).  This was intended 
to create cooperation between the members on the development of nuclear energy as a power 
source.  Though a separate treaty was signed, EURATOM entered into force at the same time as 
the Treaty of Rome.  Both are examples of the collective principal model at work, as the new 
treaties represent the fulfillment of the mandate to expand economic integration beyond the two 
industries to which it was initially confined. 
 As mentioned above, the Treaty of Rome introduced the qualified majority voting 
(QMV) arrangement, which would come to dominate voting procedure in the newly formed 
EEC.  The QMV method gives a number of votes to each member-state based on its population, 
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and passing an item on the agenda requires a minimum number of both votes and states.  Again, 
while this could be viewed as the disruption of the collective principal model, the norm of 
seeking unanimity continued to prevail decision-making.
51
  This supports the collective principal 
model, and it was only later that its fit declined and the multiple principal model came to be 
more applicable. 
 The Treaty of Rome and EURATOM both fit with a standard collective principal model 
of PA theory.  The regulatory powers of these organizations were greater than those of the 
original ECSC, representing a grant of expanded autonomy on the part of the principals.  Though 
these organizations still had relatively little autonomy, they did receive a higher grant of 
discretion in accomplishing their mandate.  Additionally, they moved beyond coordination and 
collaboration issues to deal with collective decision-making and dispute resolution in a way that 
advanced European interests.  This was a building block for further consolidation and 
integration. 
 The 1967 Brussels Treaty combined all three of these treaties under the authority of the 
EEC’s institutional structure.
52
  This step solidified the commitment to integration in Europe and 
streamlined the process.  Despite the fact that the three were still legally distinct, the level of 
consolidation of authority into common institutions is evidence of the desire of European states 
to continue integration efforts.  This pervasive attitude is essential to the process of the changing 
PA relationship.  It also represents the grant of more discretion to the agents of integration, 
which strengthens the commitment of the principals. 
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 The fit of the collective principal model began to decline in the 1970s with the 
enlargement of the EEC.  Intuitively, an increase in the number of members would make it more 
difficult for the community to come to an agreement about the best policies and how they should 
be pursued.  Specific differences, such as the French concern over UK admission, created 
additional strain as well.  From an institutional standpoint, the first effect of new members was 
adjusting the QMV scheme.  Assigning votes to the new members affected the balance of power, 
changing the number of votes and members needed to pass an initiative.  This shaped the way 
that interests were represented. 
 After having only six members since it began as the ECSC, the EEC began to seriously 
consider enlargement in the early 1970s.  Though it had considered membership applications as 
early as 1961, the first round of accessions did not take place until Denmark, Ireland, and the UK 
joined in January of 1973.
53
  UK accession in particular was an issue due to French concerns 
about divergent interests.  It was only after de Gaulle left office that the accession was approved.  
While adding new members does not necessitate a change to the PA relationship, the way that it 
affected the EU helped to facilitate the process of change. 
 Each time new members were added, it affected the QMV distribution.  Since the 
percentage of votes required to pass an initiative remained largely the same, it seems reasonable 
to say that nothing changed dramatically.  Table 1.1 shows the QMV distributions from the 
Treaty of Rome in 1958 up to the adoption of the Treaty of Nice in 2003, which fundamentally 
changed the system.  The percentages of votes required and states required to pass legislation 
remain essentially constant, yet the fit of the collective principal model does not.  Even though 
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the percentage of votes and states required to pass a legislative initiative remains constant, the 
difficulty in reaching agreement is increased.   
Table 1.1 QMV Voting 
Number of 
Member-states 
Votes Needed/Votes 
Possible 
States Needed/States 
Possible 
Original Six 12/17 (70.59%) 4/6 (66.66%) 
Nine Members 41/58 (70.70%) 6/9 (66.66%) 
Ten Members 45/63 (71.43%) 6/10 (60%) 
Twelve Members 54/76 (71.05%) 8/12 (66.66%) 
Fifteen Members 62/87 (71.26%) 10/15 (66.66%) 
 
Although adding more members over time might make it more difficult to come to a 
consensus, this does not necessarily mean that the collective principal performs dramatically 
worse.  Winners and losers are always present in any decision-making process, and one might 
reasonably ask how this signals a shift in the fit of a PA model in Europe.  The presence of more 
diverse opinions and increased difficulty in creating agreement makes alternate methods of 
pursing the mandate of integration more attractive. 
On a theoretical level, adding more member-states means has a couple of implications.  
The actual number that must agree is increased; this is obvious, but the real issue is more 
complicated still.  More members means that the potential for alternate viewpoints is higher, and 
that smaller states who would not speak for an alternate viewpoint in a smaller setting may 
support one if a larger state advances the view first and takes the lead.  In the case of the EU, this 
happened not long after membership increased. 
 The Schengen Agreement in 1985 is a strong indicator of the growing rift between 
member-states.  Schengen functionally eliminates internal borders between its signatories, 
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allowing people and goods to travel from one country to another without the need for passports 
or customs checks.  However, Schengen was contentious when it was introduced.  Only five of 
the 10 members at the time signed the Agreement, which was not created through the European 
Economic Community’s existing institutional framework.  France and Germany began what 
would become the Schengen Agreement in a separate initiative.
54
  When concerns were voiced 
that the EC may not have the authority to pass Schengen, and that it may not be in the interests of 
all members, the five original signatories went outside of the EEC and created the agreement 
between themselves.  While there is nothing to prohibit the states from doing this, it seems to run 
counter to the purpose of fostering cooperation in Europe.  This is important for two reasons. 
 First, the split is along predictable lines.  Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg, the five original signatories to the Schengen Agreement, are also five of the 
original six members.  As mentioned before, the addition of new members can introduce new 
positions and challenges to existing structure in the PA relationship.  Additionally, having 
alternate views makes it more likely that a member of the original group may articulate divergent 
preferences.  Italy’s absence from the 1985 group of signatories is less surprising than it would 
have been in 1972, when it would have been the only member of the EEC not to have signed.   
 Second, the decision of the five original signatories to establish the Schengen Agreement 
without the European Economic Community is indicative of the collective principal model’s 
worsening fit.  Their choice to pursue Schengen outside of bounds of the EEC is symptomatic of 
the shift away from consensus seeking and shared interests that characterize the collective 
principal model and toward the more individualist interest articulation of the multiple principal 
model.   
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The important distinction to make is that while the collective principal model’s fit is 
declining at this time, it is still applicable to the European Economic Community.  Although 
there is disagreement about the pace of its progression, the members are all in agreement on their 
desire for more integration.  Additionally, the level of direct oversight by the members is still 
relatively high at this time, largely conforming to the police patrol model.  These factors 
emphasize the changing nature of the EEC, but suggest a process rather than a dichotomous 
switch. 
The case for the multiple principal model is strongly affected by the development of 
Schengen, because the states that orchestrated it reached an agreement between them that did not 
include the other members.  This laid the foundation for the enhanced cooperation measures to 
be included in the EU’s operating procedures, which would be introduced by the Treaty of Nice 
(developed below) and allow for more individual contracting.   
The next significant shift in the European Community came with the Single European 
Act (SEA).  Its primary purpose was to facilitate the creation of a single market as an expansion 
of economic integration.  This was an effort on the part of the EEC to move forward with 
integration in the way it had represented that it wanted to.  The broad consensus on expanding 
integration went beyond the wish for economic expansion, but extended to other areas as well.
55
  
In this case, the SEA provides for increases in both autonomy and discretion by giving the 
policymakers in Brussels authority to take action outside of the economic arena where they had 
previously been confined. 
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The SEA also formally codified European Political Cooperation (EPC), an attempt to 
coordinate foreign policy among the member-states.  This particular measure had been attempted 
before, and had not been successful.  Its inclusion in this treaty signaled that the will of the 
member-states was for more breadth and depth of integration, and the EPC would go on to be 
expanded and revised as the current EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.  However, 
while there was broad agreement on the Single European Act, it was not passed without a hitch.   
Ireland held a national referendum on the SEA after its supreme court ruled that adopting 
it would require the constitution to be amended.
56
  This case, Crotty v. An Taoiseach, would be 
an important one in the future because it requires national referenda in Ireland when considering 
major treaties on the EU.  This way of giving preference to national interests would affect efforts 
to expand integration more than once. 
Beyond the Irish case, Denmark also took issue with the SEA.  The Danish national 
parliament rejected the Act, making it necessary to have a national referendum to ratify it.  This 
was based on concerns about the amount of power given to the EEC, similar to those voiced by 
Ireland.  The Danish objection not only delayed its signing of the SEA, but caused Italy and 
Greece to delay adding their signatures as well.  These issues and delays, based on national 
interests, caused the SEA’s entry into force to be delayed by seven months.  These issues 
demonstrate the declining fit of the collective principal model as well, though the broad support 
for expansion demonstrates that there is still a unity of interests. 
Denmark and Ireland are important for the developing of the PA narrative.  First, they are 
individual member-states contracting with the EU to adopt a version of EU acquis than the rest 
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of the principals.  This became the foundation for opt out procedures (detailed below) that 
formalize this individualist contracting, which is more in line with the multiple principal model 
than the collective principal. 
The Single European Act demonstrates the increasing problems caused by divergent 
issues at the supranational level.  On the one hand, the members broadly agreed on the expansion 
of integration in the traditional economic sector and additionally in foreign policy collaboration; 
on the other hand, the members became increasingly willing to place national interest over the 
previous consensus-building approach emphasized the collective principal approach.  The 
passage of the SEA was also accompanied by an increased emphasis on using QMV voting 
rather than seeking consensus, which further suggests a changing relationship. 
As noted above, the presence of disagreement among member-states should not be read 
as the primary indicator of a declining fit of the collective principal model; all IOs deal with 
disagreement among principals at some point, and this is just part of the process.  However, the 
specific case of the EU’s mandate for increasing integration means that dissent is more troubling 
in this case than it would be for other IOs.  In the EU, objections from states are not just about 
concern for the IO, but are directly related to retaining sovereignty.  The development of 
interests that run counter to the specific mandate of the IO are uniquely problematic, and suggest 
that the collective principal model is being disrupted. 
Maastricht: More Dramatic Changes 
After the Single European Act, the next major treaty is the Maastricht Treaty, which 
would formally transform the EEC into the European Union.  This brings the issue of the 
collective and multiple principal models to a head.  The broad interest in expanding integration 
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beyond the economic arrangements and foreign policy cooperation of the EEC is an indicator 
that the member-states generally shared a collective desire to move forward and create this new 
institution.  The requirement that the Treaty be signed and ratified by all member-states is a 
further testament to the collective nature of this process.  However, like the preceding treaties, 
Maastricht was not as much of a collective action as it seemed. 
The Maastricht Treaty introduced the three pillars, which became the backbone of the 
European Union.  The European Community (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillars represent the three policy structures 
established by the EU.  The EEC had essentially fulfilled the function that the new EC did, and 
the EPC was the precursor to the CFSP.  While the JHA did not have a precursor organization, it 
formalized cooperation efforts that had been at work in the EEC prior to the establishment of the 
EU.  Overall, the Treaty was a direct extension of efforts that had previously been undertaken. 
Vocal opposition to Maastricht came from the national parliament of the UK, where there 
were concerns over the expansion of supranational authority.  The national Parliament sought opt 
outs to social provisions related to labor laws, as well as to the common currency.  Obtaining 
these was a politically disruptive process both supranationally and domestically, which hampered 
progress in ratifying the Treaty.
57
 
Further, a national referendum in Denmark failed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 
threatened to derail the Europe-wide process.  It was only after gaining the four exceptions of the 
Edinburgh Agreement that the Danish passed the Treaty.  Special provisions on citizenship, the 
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economic union, defense policy, and justice and home affairs were needed to convince Denmark 
to sign the Treaty, which was necessary for it to enter into force.
58
 
The passage of the Maastricht Treaty and the formalization of European institutions 
signals another shift in the integration process.  Signing on to the Treaty was the strongest 
commitment states had made to the organization, and it represented the greatest expansion of 
their autonomy and discretion.  The process of bringing all of this together represents a 
commitment to achieving the benefits of enhanced credibility.  By committing formally to the 
institutions, they engaged in policy lock-in intent on fulfilling the goals of integration. 
The Maastricht Treaty signals a new set of opportunities for policymakers in Brussels.  
They receive an increase in both their autonomy and discretion, providing a broader mandate and 
allowing more freedom in achieving their goals.  While this is a major step forward for the 
process of integration, it is counter-balanced by the changing nature of the relationship. 
 Specific institutional factors are at work in this process.  In the multiple principal model, 
agents are tasked with synthesizing different interests that come from principals, yet this task is 
complicated by the contrasts that often pervade the distinct preferences that they express.  This is 
an even greater issue with more members and complex voting schemes.  The EU fits this 
perfectly, expanding its membership greatly in the 21
st
 century and bringing in new principals 
who changed the composition dramatically.  The frequent tinkering with its voting added to the 
complication.  It is unsurprising that, as a result, there were incentives for member-states to 
reduce their oversight and direct participation. 
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Post-Maastricht, the character of the relationship between the member-states and the EU 
has diverged dramatically from the relationships that existed between the founding of the ECSC 
and the EU’s creation.  First, the process of passing the Treaty itself was a major divergence 
from previous negotiations.  Rather than seeking consensus on provisions, or the unanimity of 
ratification that they desired, policymakers were willing to grant concessions to member-states in 
the form of opt out provisions.  The precedent that was set in the adoption of the Schengen 
Agreement was extended to the Maastricht Treaty as a way to acquire ratification from all of the 
member-states.  Though all of the states did ratify the Treaty, Denmark and the UK were allowed 
to change the terms of their agreement, which is akin to re-contracting with the agent.  The 
development of the EU in subsequent treaties has reinforced this action as legitimate, completing 
the change to a multiple principal model. 
 A number of things changed after the EU was created in 1993 that affected the PA 
relationship.  The character of the relationship was noticeably different, as European structures 
encouraged fundamentally different ways of distributing power.  Expanding the scope of the 
European institutions increased the amounts of both discretion and autonomy available to the 
EU, and the growth of supranational bureaucracy made it even easier to do so.  In developing the 
Single European Market, the Council of Ministers was tasked with transposing 282 directives 
into national law so that a more integrated common market could be established.
59
  Further 
synthesis of markets in Europe, regulated by the EU, represent an increase in the level of its 
discretion.  Specifically, while it was given the goal of building a common market, most of the 
synthesis was done at the EU level. 
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It also gained the opportunity to develop further measures for integration, which may be 
thought of as an increase in its autonomy.  The member-states, utilizing its expertise and the 
promise of credible commitments, were willing to step back more and allow the EU more 
freedom.  The model that characterizes oversight of the EU has shifted to be more in line with 
the fire-alarm model rather than police patrol.
60
 
The growth of EU institutions has an important effect on the development of the 
relationship between it and the member-states.  Increasing the number of staff that work 
specifically for an IO has been shown to increase members’ costs of negotiation and 
information,
61
 which increases the propensity for slack to develop.  This type of growth lends   
itself specifically to the development of slippage, and creates opportunities for agents to act in 
their own interests.
62
 
The Maastricht Treaty’s institutional framework gave the institutions of the EU the 
ability to create and enforce laws for all of Europe, and the expansion of its resources have 
enabled it to do so in a way that it previously could not.  The implementation of the euro and the 
three pillars (especially the Common Foreign and Security Policy) represent an increase in the 
agent’s autonomy.  It gains the capacity to make decisions for, and speak on behalf of, its 
members in economic policymaking, and also a new policy area in which to operate. 
Article 2 of the Maastricht Treaty sets the task of the EU as creating balanced economic 
development and facilitating trade restrictions.  Article 100 further authorizes the Council of 
Ministers to create standards by approximating national laws. 
63
  These developments grant the 
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EU more power than it previously held to pursue its mandate.  In this case, the Council is given a 
high degree of discretion in deciding how to bring national laws together in a way that makes the 
most sense. 
Regarding the euro system, Article 109j of the Maastricht Treaty gave the EU control 
over the process of establishing the common currency.
64
  They have control of the whole 
process, which is to say that they facilitate the establishment of the system and allow each 
member access.  This demonstrates a greatly expanded economic mandate, beyond anything it 
had previously undertaken. 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) represents another place where the EU 
received more of a mandate than ever before.  Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty provides the 
EU with the discretion to craft a policy that is designed to meet specific objectives related to a 
collective, external security policy that is intended to bring the member-states together.
65
  These 
new mandates represent a grant of more discretion and an expanded mandate for the EU. 
 The Amsterdam Treaty was the first major treaty adopted after the Maastricht Treaty.  
When it entered into force in May of 1999, the Treaty expanded the rights of individuals living 
under the EU, and the scope of European authority in general.  Included in this were the 
development and expansion of the EC and CFSP pillars.  After Amsterdam, the EU assumed the 
ability to make civil laws and decide immigration issues, as well as legislate on its values.
66
  The 
expansion of the EU’s mandate fits, again, with the PA explanation that the agent’s strategic 
decision-making incorporates renegotiating over time on the basis of performance.  In this case, 
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the single currency and the three pillars provided opportunities for further consolidation and 
expanded authority. 
The Treaty of Nice represented a second attempt to adjust the fledgling institutions of the 
EU in the face of practical issues as well as the eastward expansion.  When it went into effect in 
2003, it made several changes.  Included in these were alterations to the QMV voting scheme 
and to adjust the size of the Commission; Nice also expanded the role of the European Court of 
Justice so that they could take on more cases.
67
 
The Lisbon Treaty represents even more support for these principles.  A follow-up on the 
failed attempt at establishing a European Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty highlights changes in 
the EU environment.  The shift in the Council of Ministers from unanimous decision-making to 
modified, double majority QMV allows individual nations’ interests and interactions to become 
more important.  One of the major criticisms of the Lisbon Treaty is that moves power away 
from national governments and centralizes the power of the EU itself.
68
 
These expansions and changes in its technical capacity reflect a growing climate in which 
the EU continued to add more and more to its authority.  The expansion of its authority and the 
institutional growth it underwent at this time was a major step forward for the EU, and allowed it 
to make greater use of its discretion than ever before.  This process supports the interpretation 
that member-states moved toward a fire alarm model, since they allowed the EU more discretion 
and did not seek direct control in the way that they had previously. 
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Opt Outs 
One of the first major changes after the Maastricht Treaty was the introduction of the 
euro as a common currency.  This was an important milestone for the EU, and one of its greatest 
achievements.  The process of allowing the UK and Denmark to opt out of the euro has been 
consolidated by future treaties, changing the emphasis of the EU from creating Europe-wide 
initiatives with the support of all to securing the agreement that it can.  Its increasing willingness 
to allow members to have different commitments signals a changing relationship. 
In practice, opting out is an option that is only exercised by a few states, but its existence 
confirms the approach taken by this thesis.  Allowing states to re-contract individually means 
that the multiple principal model is the correct one for evaluating the relationship.  The opt outs 
that Britain, Denmark, and Ireland have obtained demonstrate that states do contract individually 
with the EU, even if all member-states broadly support the same mandate of increased 
integration. 
A moment should be taken to consider the case of Sweden.  Though they have obtained a 
de facto opt out to the euro by choosing not to enter the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
that was introduced in 1999, known as ERM II.  Joining ERM II is considered to be voluntary for 
non-euro zone countries, and is one of the four criteria necessary to join the euro.
69
  Though 
Sweden’s derogation requires that they join the euro zone, they have been able to avoid doing so 
by not joining ERM II.
70
 
The process of utilizing opt outs means that they demands they make on the principal are 
different from those made by the rest of the states, which are expressed in more of a collective 
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way.  In this case, the individual states utilizing opt out benefits communicate individual interests 
directly and adopt different versions of final policies, which makes them distinct from the other 
member-states who adopt the policies even if they do not benefit to the degree that other 
members do.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the case of the states who contract separately. 
Figure 2.1: Opt Out Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although they have been able to circumvent the requirement to join the euro, this should 
be distinguished from the formal re-contracting that the UK, Ireland, and Denmark have 
achieved.  Though (re-)contracting may be formal or informal,
71
 the circumstances surrounding 
the two are different.  Sweden’s informal opt out was obtained by its interpretation and 
enforcement of EU acquis, while the UK, Ireland and Denmark received formal opt outs during 
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IGCs on specific treaties.  Formal and informal opt outs act as re-contracting mechanisms for 
member-states. 
Though the opt out has been considered to be dangerous to the process of integration by 
fragmenting the commitments of member-states,
72
 it signals an important shift in the PA 
relationship.  This kind of individual contracting demonstrates a shift toward a multiple principal 
model.  There are a number of different interpretations for the use of opt outs, ranging from a 
protection of sovereignty
73
 to avoiding integration
74
, but their presence is the important thing, 
solidifying the change that the EU has undergone.   
On face, allowing states to opt out of provisions of the EU treaties seems to be a measure 
that would hurt the process of integration by preventing a unified push toward its increase.  
Strategically, it makes more sense for the EU to maintain equal commitments from all of its 
members and to move forward collectively.  Allowing states to work outside of the supranational 
framework it provides sounds like it would lead to a situation in which they put their own 
interests above that of EU, but this may not be the case.   
Rebecca Adler-Nissen attempted to examine the effect of the opt out in more detail by 
conducting in-depth interviews with EU elites from the UK and Denmark specifically, as well as 
other member states, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, national parliaments, 
and experts.
75
  Her interviews suggest that while the opt out has had a marked effect on the 
institutional character of the EU, it need not be viewed as a negative. 
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Instead, they point to the conclusion that the representatives of these states still feel that 
they are working toward a particular kind of integration.
76
  Rather than seeing themselves as 
actively promoting national sovereignty over integration, they see themselves as seeking a 
particular model of integration.  This ideological commitment, considered from the point of view 
of the EU as an agent, would provide an assurance that the opt outs allow for more good than 
harm.  They let the rest of the EU move forward, and the states who opt out have always have the 
option to later join the treaty provisions that they were previously exempt from.  This means that 
they are not trying to withdraw from the relationship, but are maintaining it in a different way. 
The ability to opt into commitments that they previously were not party to is a strong 
strategic reason for the EU to allow opt outs, one that has been utilized.  The UK has been 
especially willing to consider the opt in option when necessary.  Though it obtained an opt out 
for the area of freedom, security, and justice,
77
 as well as the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar,
78
 it 
has taken advantage of the option to opt in to provisions on a case-by-case basis.
79
  There are two 
reasons that this important.  First, as mentioned, the opt out fits in with the EU’s agent strategy, 
since they can move forward with integration efforts that include most members, and there is 
only a risk of the members who opted out later choosing to opt in.  Allowing opt outs has not 
empirically lead more states to request the same accommodation or lead to any movement to 
undermine the initiative in question. 
Second, it underscores the distinct groups of principals.  More accurately, the EU has one 
large group of member-states that generally act as a collective principal, but faces the potential 
for individual exceptions in the UK, Ireland, and Denmark.  Theoretically, this confirms the 
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application of the multiple principal in the way that this thesis undertakes, while practically it 
emphasizes the structure of the EU.  Even when states choose to opt out, they still view 
themselves as part of the integration process and believe they are working toward implementing 
it in the way that is best for Europe. 
“Closer” and “Enhanced” Cooperation 
The changes of the EU have happened over time, but as before, they have been the most 
apparent in the way that treaties after Maastricht have changed the institutional arrangement.  
Additionally, the way that member-states have positioned themselves relative to the EU has had 
an effect on the way that it conducts its business.  This is apparent in the way that the relations 
between the two have changed over a relatively short amount of time. 
One of the major structural changes made by the Amsterdam Treaty involves a process 
that is referred to as “closer cooperation.”  Under this process, a majority of the member-states 
could work together and implement a policy or procedure of advanced cooperation that other 
member-states would not be obliged to join.  This measure would have to be approved by the 
Commission, and the existing set of community laws was had to remain unaffected.  The primary 
application was to be in the first and third pillars, and it was intended to be a last resort option for 
states.
80
  Though it was not used in its initial form, the provision signals the changes that the EU 
is undergoing.  The willingness to forego developing the kind of agreement that previously 
characterized negotiations is indicative of the difficulty of maintaining a collective principal 
arrangement in an IO with the size and scope of the EU. 
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From a strategic standpoint, it is to the EU’s benefit to encourage this sort of 
development.  Giving states a way to create this sort of agreement provides a way to increase 
integration and for the EU to be involved, without dissenters having the opportunity to derail the 
process.  This is a way of increasing its competencies and exercising the discretion that it has to 
fulfill its mandate.  Further, encouraging preference heterogeneity by facilitating this sort of 
outlet encourages working through the EU to express and develop those preferences. 
In the Treaty of Nice, the process was revised and came to be known as “enhanced 
cooperation.”  The process was also simplified to become more usable: the number of members 
required to be involved was decreased from a majority to nine, and the proposals were only 
required to respect existing EU laws, as opposed to not affecting them at all.  Co-decision powers 
were also given to the European Parliament.
81
  These changes made this option a more viable 
one for member-states to use.  An initial attempt was made at using enhanced cooperation to pass 
an initiative related to divorce proceedings, but it was not passed before the Lisbon Treaty 
altered the rules again, and so will be put aside for a moment. 
The development of the enhanced cooperation procedure is important from an agent 
strategy standpoint.  Making the process easier to use offers a way to exploit the existing 
preference heterogeneity in the EU and promote its institutional structure as a way to work 
around the opposition that can develop to those interests.  This type of increase in integration is 
one possible interpretation of its mandate, and the one that allows the most action to occur under 
its institutional framework.  This action fits with the claim that agents can reinterpret their 
mandates in an attempt to gain more authority.  Both longstanding commitments and substantial 
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prior delegation are factors that lead to agents being more willing to reinterpret their mandates.
82
  
Thus, when the member-states do things like grant a great deal of authority to the EU all at once 
(as was the case with the Maastricht Treaty), they are expanding its mandate. 
The Lisbon Treaty updated the enhanced cooperation principle in a significant way, 
expanding the areas of its application, including defense.
83
  The opportunities for the use of 
enhanced cooperation have expanded, but the same limits apply as under previous treaties.  For 
action to be taken, the Commission must decide to submit the members’ initiative to the Council, 
whose approval must be echoed by the Parliament.
84
  This allows the EU to control the way that 
heterogeneous preferences are exercised, and represents the culmination of the process begun 
with the Schengen Agreement. 
Now, even when action cannot be passed through the regular institutional channels, an 
option still exists for states to pursue an alternate approach that is within the bounds of the EU.  
Even though the member-states initiate this process, the EU must grant approval, which allows 
them to functionally control the process.  This ensures that the EU will control integration in 
Europe, even if it does not pass broadly.  By controlling if and how integration occurs, the EU 
has made use of the development of the enhanced cooperation procedure to expand its own 
authority through a reinterpretation of its mandate.  Since it is responsible for integration in 
Europe, it has used renegotiation to create a way to affect these efforts even when the political 
will does not exist to use EU legislative channels to do so. 
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Role Reversal: Theoretical Development 
 Rather than being distinctly defined as a collective principal or multiple principal 
arrangement, the first contribution of this thesis is to identify the EU’s shift from the former to 
the latter.  Rather than being a single change from one relationship to another, a transformation 
took place that makes it more accurate to describe the EU as a hybrid of the collective and 
multiple principal arrangements. However, this should serve as a warning not to think of the new 
relationship as static.  In a separate development, the EU has been moving toward a relationship 
with its member-states that suggests the reversal of the principal and agent roles.  Though this 
may seem, by definition, to be an impossibility, there are clear reasons to believe that the 
uniqueness of the EU supports this conclusion. 
 At the most basic level, it can be argued that the reversal of principal and agent roles 
cannot happen because the principal makes its initial grant of authority and can revoke it at any 
time.  However, although all member-states maintain the option to vote down IGC treaties or to 
withdraw from the EU, neither of these things has ever occurred before.  Not only that, but the 
possibility of either taking place is so low that treaty opt outs have been called “the only form of 
treaty defection in the European Union (EU) that exists today.”
85
  In a very real way, this 
suggests that the EU controls the pace and scope of integration, and states cannot rescind their 
grant of authority.  With this level of artificial limitation imposed on the withdrawal of authority, 
something common to all PA relationships, no other facet of a traditional relationship should be 
taken for granted. 
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 Though policies at the EU level are often contentious, membership in the EU obliges 
states “to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”
86
  
This ideological commitment inevitably creates tension between member-states and the EU, 
which must be resolved.  In instances where they come into conflict with one another, the 
Consolidated Treaty has specific guidelines for dealing with the issues.  The Treaty gives the 
Commission authority to bring states before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for not 
complying with EU law,
87
 and the ECJ has the authority to compel member-states to comply.
88
  
As a result, states are obliged to keep pace with the integration efforts of the EU. 
 This process is a big step for the EU.  The Commission was granted authority to begin 
proceedings related to non-enforcement under the Maastricht Treaty, and the option to impose 
penalties for noncompliance was added later.  Granting this level of enforcement to the 
Commission, and including the ability to mandate punishments, signals a major increase in both 
the authority given to the EU by member-states.
89
  This procedure has been utilized a number of 
times, such as in a 2003 case brought against Italy.  In this case, the ECJ ruled in favor of the 
Commission, finding that Italy had breached the treaty by failing to repeal a law that conflicted 
with EU law.
90
  Finding in favor of the Commission affirms the autonomy to take this sort of 
independent action. 
Additionally, the ECJ is allowed to make preliminary rulings on EU law
91
 and is the 
arbiter of disputes between member-states related to integration.
92
  The level of discretion that 
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has been given to the tandem of the Commission and ECJ demonstrates that it is supranational 
institutions that control the scope of integration. 
 The EU controls the process of further integration through membership and enforcement.  
Members are locked in and do not have a viable means of exit, and the EU can take measures to 
ensure that they are bound to fulfill their obligations even in situations where they conflict with 
national laws.  Though opt outs provide an opportunity for member-states to work around this, 
they still allow the EU to carry on the process of integration and bring members along later if 
they decide to opt in.  This narrative is adjusted somewhat by the reality that the EU controls the 
opt in process as well.  On two separate occasions, the Commission’s interpretation of EU acquis 
has prevented the UK from opting into provisions they had previously opted out of and later 
intended to join.
93
  So, the member-states’ ability to utilize opt outs is truncated as well, giving 
the EU even more control over the process of access to integration. 
Models of Role Reversal 
 While the transition from a collective to collective-multiple principal model has already 
occurred, the current shift toward a reverse PA model is not necessarily at odds with this 
development. While the multiple principal model replaced the collective model, the shift of 
principal and agent roles need not interact with this process.  Instead, once a role reversal occurs, 
it may be embody any type of relationship from chapter one.  Figure 2.2 demonstrates the most 
basic form of this reverse relationship. 
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Figure 2.2: Basic Reverse PA Relationship 
 
 The level of analysis involved in characterizing the roles of the principal and agent is 
different from that of identifying whether the parties act in a collective or multiple principal 
model.  Figure 2.3 shows the basic form of the reverse principal-agent argument, which can 
easily be extended to the EU.  In this model, the EU sets the scope and pace of integration, which 
all of its member-states would follow.   
Figure 2.3: Reverse Collective Principal Relationship 
 
The final possibility, and the one that applies to the current form of the EU, is that the 
shift may take the form of a reverse multiple principal relationship.  In this case, even though 
roles have been reversed and the EU is the current driver of integration in Europe, it is still the 
case that individual members (i.e. the UK, Denmark, Ireland, etc.) can negotiate opt outs.  Figure 
2.4 demonstrates the reverse multiple principal relationship. 
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Figure 2.4: Reverse Multiple Principal Relationship 
 
The practice of allowing opt outs does not interfere with the establishment of the reverse 
multiple principal model, because the existence of opt outs merely confirms (again) that re-
contracting exists within the relationship.  Just as the EU re-contracts with states in the original 
model, so can states re-contract with it in a reversed relationship.  As alluded to earlier, member-
states have few other options available to them beyond re-contracting. 
Unlike the shift to a multiple principal model, this transition is not complete.  The shift to 
a reverse principal-agent model has been begun in Europe, but it has not been completed.  
Chapter three will consider the state of the EU today: where in this process it currently lies, and 
the reason for its development in reaching this point.  Concluding, consideration of the 
possibility for this process to occur elsewhere will also be included, along with avenues of future 
research.   
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Chapter Three: Europe Today 
 
 Having established that the principal-agent relationship applies to the EU, that it has 
undergone a shift from a collective principal model to a hybrid collective/multiple principal 
model, and that a shift can occur to a new theoretical category of role reversal, three important 
tasks remain.  First, a justification for why the shift has developed is important, and that it 
provides a way to examine the current state of relations between the EU and its member-states.  
Finally, considering the possible extensions of this model and avenues for future research is 
important to conclude. 
 The issue that warrants initial attention in the role reversal is an explanation for why it 
should occur.  Standard principal-agent accounts have the principal(s) delegating authority and 
discretion to the agent, but firmly keeping control of their role as principal.  The answer to why 
this process has seemingly been altered in the case of the EU can be found in a look back at the 
theoretical literature on PA relationships.  The reason for the shift is the same as the reason for 
delegation in the first place. 
 One of the reasons for delegating, creating policy lock-in, is at the heart of the changes in 
the EU.  Since “principals ensure their utility by crafting careful mandates that are difficult to 
undo or by structuring voting rules in ways that ensure the continued dominance of those who 
hold power at the moment of the rule drafting”
94
, the literature on increasing integration in 
Europe has focused on the decisions of member-states to give more authority to the EU as a way 
to ensure the credibility and longevity of commitment to the process.  It is important to point out 
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that, though the EU received both an increase in its autonomy and discretion, the expansion of 
authority does not necessitate an increase in discretion. 
 Maintaining this level of commitment on the part of the member-states is important to 
ensure continued participation over time and in the face of increasing membership and greater 
preference heterogeneity, especially when they want to continue to incur the benefits of 
delegation.
95
  In this case, seeking to reap the perceived benefits of further integration over time 
has led to the grant of greater autonomy and discretion to the EU so that future initiatives will be 
able to pass more easily. 
 The Commission plays an especially important role to play in this process, and it is 
empowered to drive the way that it forward.  Specifically, Article 211 says that it can, “Ensure 
that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are 
applied” and to “Exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of 
the rules laid down by the latter.”
96
  This is driven home by Article 226, which has given them 
the authority to pursue states that do not comply.
97
  This makes it an enforcer of the legislation 
that the EU passes, and strengthens the role reversal by giving it the tools to keep states in line 
with its acquis. 
 At this point, what has been described still fits the narrative of a standard PA relationship 
and it might be objected that the combination of lock-in and re-contracting has simply led to an 
IO with above average authority.  However, the degree of lock-in is much greater, combining 
both the prohibitively high cost of exit and the capacity of the EU to control implementation of 
                                                          
95
 Talbot and Page, 1987 
96
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008; Article 211 
97
 Ibid.; Article 226 
53 
 
its treaties and laws.  The EU has become something else, based on the way that it can dictate 
policy to its member-states.   
 Creating lock-in is a way to both avoid losses and maintain benefits over time.  This is 
particularly beneficial at the supranational and international levels, ensuring that the mandate(s) 
of the organizations can be fulfilled without being subject to perpetual challenges from national 
governments and citizens.
98
  The empirical development of the EU fits this narrative 
exceptionally well, as member-states have challenged its growth and changes over time.  Being 
able to develop independent of these concerns has allowed the EU to work steadily on increasing 
integration in spite of the environment in which it is operating. 
Almost from the beginning of its consolidation to the EU, there have been concerns about 
delegation to Brussels.  Despite some initial optimism about delegation in the European 
Community
99
, the issues of distribution of policymaking authority emerged almost 
immediately
100
 and remain a concern.  The expansion of the EU to 27 member-states has made 
this problem plain to see, as the distinct interests of the different nations often prevent them from 
clearly communicating a preference to the EU.  As predicted by the theoretical literature, the 
tendency in these situations is for slack to develop. 
Greater preference heterogeneity and increased delegation of authority have led the 
arrangement to a point where the EU can increasingly make decisions on behalf of all of its 
members.  Importantly, while this grant of authority is sometimes explicit, it is often implicitly 
assumed by the EU.
101
  This takes advantage of both the increased grant of autonomy and 
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discretion, and the slack that develops as a result of preference heterogeneity.  The important 
question to answer is whether this was intentional or not. 
 Though the shift to a reverse role model has begun to occur, this does not necessarily 
mean that the way it has been carried out was opposed to the direct interests of the member-
states.  The gains made by the EU need not be considered as losses for its members, but may be 
thought of as a positive development.  The answer lies in the intentions of the original principals 
in moving forward with integration. 
 As mentioned before, creating lock-in is beneficial as a way to ensure credible 
commitments from principals and to prevent particular preferences from dominating.  In this 
way, the expansion of autonomy and discretion to the EU can be in line with preferences of 
member-states.  The delegation of power was specifically designed to create this level of 
credibility by granting these high levels of autonomy and discretion.
102
  The intention of the EU 
is important, because it shows that integration may still be moving in the way that was intended 
by the original principals. 
 Importantly, looking at the way that the EU has developed does point to this conclusion.  
The intention, when creating the European institutions, was that the member-states should move 
toward more empowerment of the EU rather than further consolidation of national agendas.
103
  In 
this regard, the transition to a role reversal model is not unexpected.  Looking at the back and 
forth battle between supranational interests and national concerns will underscore the tension that 
is present and frame the final questions of whether this development is possible elsewhere and 
how research should proceed from this point and moving forward. 
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Tension in the EU 
 Anxiety about the EU has existed for some time, frequently discussed under the rubric of 
the “democratic deficit”
 
in EU studies
104
 and used in reference to the level of understanding that 
individual European constituents have about this organization and the extent of their direct 
participation in the EU.  The tension between these two forces represents the major issue that 
must be navigated to determine the future of the PA relationship in Europe.  The increasing 
pushback from member-states is a challenge that the EU must work on overcoming. 
 With the general question of integration’s scope looming over Europe at the start of the 
new millennium, there were already concerns about the drive to “create” a supranational 
Europe.
105
  Nevertheless, integration efforts continued; one of the major shifts was when political 
pressure caused British trade unions to change to a pro integration stance.
106
 
 Some major pushback began to surface as states’ national policies reflected their personal 
opposition to the economic policy that the EU was pursuing.
107
  Stephan Leibfried documents the 
way that national welfare programs were expanded to counter-balance the growth of market 
integration created by the Amsterdam and Maastricht Treaties.  Parallel to this, Frank Decker 
shares several concerns about the failure of the EU to develop a political system that represents 
all of its member-states and their citizens.
108
 
 The tug of war to determine the direction and extent of integration continued as new issue 
areas opened up for the EU to become involved with.  One of the most contentious issues for 
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supranational policymaking has been immigration.  Further, citizens continued to identify with 
national interests over supranational interests, especially on immigration.
109
  The different social, 
economic, and political situations across Europe have a major impact on individual immigration 
policy, which drove many national governments to oppose integration in this area.
110
  Not only 
was a rift developing between the national governments of member-states and the EU, but the 
direction of initiative was changing as well. 
 The narrative of the EU’s development has shifted from an environment where citizens 
and national governments were generally willing to trust the agents of integration to one where 
they are wary and are much more outspoken against the policymakers in Brussels.
111
  This 
“constraining dissensus” has developed over time in a way that creates more challenges to 
integration than in the past, and this sentiment has developed more force than ever before. 
Application: The UK 2014 Opt Out 
 The strongest current demonstration of this shift can be found in the UK’s handling of the 
potential to opt out of the criminal justice provisions that will go into effect in June of 2014.  In 
January 2012, an Open Europe paper discussed the possibilities for handling the 130 EU crime 
laws that will go into effect, and argued that the choice it faced was “a clear choice between 
more or less control over the British justice system – a choice between repatriation or more 
Europe.”
112
  Under Protocol 36, the UK has the option to opt out of the provisions if they choose, 
and to opt back into certain provisions.  Consistent with what would be a multiple principal opt 
out decision, the authors argue that the UK should prioritize national concerns and opt out. 
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The opt out under Protocol 36 means that the UK cannot opt out of specific provisions; 
they must opt out of all of them, then opt back into the ones that are of interest to them.  The 
Open Europe report contends that the country should focus on its own interests, and that the 
option to opt in at a later time means they need not worry about being excluded.
113
  This is 
presented as the best possible solution for the UK, and the emphasis is firmly on national 
concerns as being more important than supranational ones.  After the report was published, a 
group of over 100 MPs expressed their support for the position in a joint letter to the Daily 
Telegraph.
114
 
 In the preceding framework of multiple principal influence, this makes sense.  However, 
the effect of the reversal tendency has been felt very recently.  In September 2012, a report from 
the Centre from European Legal Studies argued that the opt out would cause more problems than 
it solved.  The authors caution that the UK would end up attempting to opt back into nearly all of 
the measures, and that the ones it would remain exempt from are not practical concerns for the 
country.
115
  If the argument for not exercising the opt out were based solely on the 
inconsequential nature of the provisions it remain out of, and the reality that it would likely opt 
into the majority of them, the initially favored opt out position may have carried the day.  
However, the pressure of the EU was felt in a way that fits the narrative of PA reversal. 
 Among the considerations in the paper, the issue of opting back into the provisions is 
raised.
116
  That the UK will be allowed to opt back into provisions after exercising a block opt 
out is not something that can be taken for granted.  To opt out with the predetermined intention 
of later opting back into its measures is an approach that has not previously been taken, and 
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should be approached with caution.  Since the benefits of opting out are minimal, owing to the 
nature of the provisions that it would remain separate from, and the risks associated with opting 
back into the ones it wanted to over time, the authors conclude that it is not in the UK’s best 
interests to exercise the block opt out.
117
 
 This conclusion was supported by the House of Lords’ EU Committee report, published 
on April 23, 2013.
118
  The report specifically cites concerns over difficulties with opting back 
into the provisions as reasons why the block opt out should not be used.  The report indicates that 
the “pick and mix” approach of opting into some measures after exercising the block opt out 
“may not be a straightforward process”, and that it “would inevitably lead to difficulties.”
119
  The 
Committee concludes that the use of the block opt out, whether or not it is followed by 
provisional use of the opt in, would not be in the country’s best interests.
120
 
 The conclusion itself is important, but the justification for it is critical.  Even if the UK 
would end up opting back into nearly all of the provisions, they might still reasonably exercise 
the opt out in the interests of national sovereignty.  Instead, it is concerns about the challenge of 
opting back in that caused the European Union Committee to conclude that it should not be used.  
This suggests, in line with the previous chapters development, that the EU can exert pressure on 
member-states to take a certain action akin to the principal-agent relationship.  This offers strong 
support for the idea that the theoretical reversal is beginning to become apparent. 
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Future Development 
Based on the preceding development, two things must be determined: whether the 
collective/multiple principal model will continue to hold, and if the role reversal can be expected 
to develop.  First, it seems likely that the multiple principal model will continue to be applicable 
in many areas of the EU.  Even though derogation means that recent additions and future 
additions are required to adopt the EU acquis, Sweden’s avoidance of the euro demonstrates that 
this not as definite as it might seem.  The EU has been content to allow Sweden to use the ruling 
on ERM II to skirt the requirement that they implement the euro, which moves them decidedly 
away from the collective and into a separate category. 
 Additionally, the use of the opt out will likely continue.  Though it does not appear that 
the UK will exercise it in the case of the criminal justice measures it is currently considering, 
Protocol 36 still allows for Denmark, Ireland, and the UK to exercise opt outs.  As long as these 
members have the opportunity to negotiate different agreements through the use of this measure, 
the multiple principal model will carry at least some traction in characterizing the way that 
agreements are made. 
 The principles of enhanced cooperation also make it likely that the multiple model will 
continue to be important.  Though enhanced cooperation was not used prior to the Lisbon Treaty 
entering into force, it saw its first application in common divorce laws in 2010, which are 
expected to be expanded.
121
  The common patent laws that are being implemented in this fashion 
are also an indicator of the growing support for enhanced cooperation.
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  A “multi-speed 
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Europe”, based on integration through enhanced cooperation will definitely favor the multiple 
model. 
 Maintaining the use of existing opt outs and the development of more exceptions based 
on enhanced cooperation and opt outs demonstrates that the multiple model is likely to continue 
to be the dominant one that should be applied to the member-states.  Additionally, a commitment 
to a multiple model for the member-states does not have any effect on the role reversal model 
developed here.  Whether the impetus for integration comes from the member-states or from the 
EU itself, the multiple model for the member-states appears to hold. 
  The new theoretical category of a reversal in the principal and agent roles needs to be 
considered from the perspective of its extension to other IOs.  As noted before, the development 
of the EU has been very unique in the world of IOs, and has created an institutional identity that 
is unlikely to be duplicated anywhere.  Much of this is closely connected to the way the 
principal-agent narrative has changed as well.  Though the EU is unique, there are some 
developments that have been particularly important to the change in PA roles and would be 
important to this shift developing in the context of a different IO. 
 First, it is impossible to undersell the importance of the EU’s longevity.  Though it has 
not been known as the EU for its entire existence, the growth and development of its institutions 
over time is essential as an explanation for the shift.  The theoretical literature suggests that, with 
a longer time horizon, an IO will be more likely to re-contract and receive an expansion in its 
autonomy and discretion.  Developing incrementally over several decades has given the EU the 
chance to facilitate this sort of shift.  The EU is one of the longest-tenured IOs, and this 
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institutional development would be needed for another organization to experience the role 
reversal. 
The level of preference heterogeneity that exists in the EU is also important.  Having a 
number of member-states with divergent interests means that consolidation of authority in the IO 
not only makes sense, but also that changing this arrangement becomes potentially detrimental to 
some states’ interests.  This consolidation of authority creates two competing situations.  One 
possibility is that autonomy and discretion are given to the agent so that they can deal with 
divergent preferences and find a solution that does not disadvantage any one member too much. 
Alternatively, this emphasis on the authority of the agent can create slack that allows the 
IO the opportunity to do what they want with their discretion.  Doing this solidifies the IO’s 
position and makes it the more important one in the relationship.  These two possibilities can 
both be realized in other IOs.  Preference heterogeneity is common in the international 
community, and the differences between members can easily create opportunities for IOs to take 
advantage.  The unique circumstance of the EU is found in the scope of its authority; it has the 
ability to make policy in so many areas that there are many more dimensions on which 
preferences can diverge.  IOs whose members have highly divergent preferences or who expand 
the scope of their authority have the potential for a similar shift. 
Perhaps the most important factor in the development of the role reversal is the 
institutional climate of the EU.  Since its purpose when it was conceived was to create a 
supranational connection between nations, the EU is a unique case among IOs and principal-
agent theory.  In a PA relationship, the roles of principal and agent are determined based on 
where authority is vested, and the EU has been specifically designed to change the arrangement 
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of authority in Europe.  This is its defining characteristic, and the reason that this development is 
most likely limited (for the moment, at least) to the EU.  Since it was designed to facilitate the 
transfer of power from the member-states to the supranational organization, the EU is a distinct 
case. 
The relationship between a state and an IO naturally involves a grant of authority, and 
regional cooperative organizations are especially likely to claim some of their members’ 
sovereignty.  The major difference is that the growth of the EU has deliberately been about the 
transfer of autonomy and discretion, because it is in the EU’s mandate to do so.  This 
institutional climate is the feature of the EU that makes it stand out the most in terms of its 
development. 
Moving forward, there are a number of research areas that are suggested by the preceding 
development.  First, the principal-agent literature should be expanded to account for the 
possibility of a shift in the relationship from a collective to multiple principal model.  The EU 
has undergone a transformation in the way its members interact with the IO and is clearly no 
longer well-represented by the collective model.  Examining other PA relationships in IOs may 
demonstrate the same dynamic character that the EU has shown. 
Next, the EU itself needs to be monitored from a PA perspective.  The changes that it has 
undergone seem counterintuitive in some ways, but the narrative of a delegated mandate for 
integration makes the PA relationship attractive as a way to think about its development over 
time.  Collective commitments and re-contracting have a high degree of explanatory power in the 
context of the EU, and the relationship is prime for more research. 
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Finally, the possibility of the role reversal in principal-agent relationships is a major 
development for principal-agent theory.  Theoretically, this seems limited to a very specific 
institutional setting that needs to be further explored.  The potential for the shift to occur is found 
in long-term PA relationships with a broad mandate and a high degree of both autonomy and 
discretion.  Though this has not definitively occurred in Europe, the development of the theory 
should coincide with a close watching of the EU to see whether this continues.  The potential for 
PA theory to develop in this way is an exciting twist that should be explored, and its prime 
litmus test is in the way that the EU changes going forward.  
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